Constitutional Law--Smith Act--Requirement of Words of Incitement by McD., J.
Volume 60 Issue 1 Article 11 
December 1957 
Constitutional Law--Smith Act--Requirement of Words of 
Incitement 
J. McD. 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. McD., Constitutional Law--Smith Act--Requirement of Words of Incitement, 60 W. Va. L. Rev. (1957). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss1/11 
This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
CASE COMMENTS
Govm ITAL lRTain~rs, 56 (1956). In light of this great diver-
sity of opinion throughout the country, it appears that the Supreme
Court has not created a satisfactory test whereby it could be the
judge of what is or is not obscene throughout the whole United
States.
The Court, on the same day the principal case was decided,
went even further in its crusade against obscenity by affirming a
New York court which permitted an injunction to be issued, without
a hearing, to prevent the sale of literature alleged to be obscene.
Kingsley Books v. Brown, 77 Sup. Ct. 1325 (1957). This leaves open
the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no one can ade-
quately guard against. Winters v. New York, supra; United States
v. Cohen Grocery Co., supra. Those who urge increased repression
of allegedly obscene books are, of course, convinced that obscenity
can be identified. In reality, however, the word does not refer to
a thing so much as a mood. Its dimensions are fixed part by eye
of the individual beholder and part by generalized opinion. GELL-
HORN, INDnrmuAL FRnxmoM AN Gov-munomwAL REsTARN'rs (1956);
HAumrr, BAN~rN Booys (2d ed. 1956).
It is submitted, therefore, that the Court should either abandon
any attempt to create a test for obscenity and give the broad sweep
of the first and fourteenth amendments full support, or limit is cen-
sorship to only 'hard core" pornography. (This term itself may
be equally as difficult to define or create a test for, but its use would
narrow the censor's scope of material.)
Although there may be nothing of any possible value to society
in a particular book, it is as much entitled to the protection of free
speech as the best of literature. Winters v. New York, supra. For
so long as these statutes may be construed by any court to include
writings which are other than pornographic, a constant threat to the
free press exists. Note 40 IL. L. RFv. 417 (1946).
J. E_. J.
CoNsTIrroNAL LAw-Smi'T ACE-REQUIREMENT OF WORDS
OF INcrMENT.-Petitioners, fourteen leaders and organizers of the
Communist Party in California, were convicted of conspiring
(1) to advocate and teach the duty and necessity of the overthrow
of the Government by force and violence and (2) to organize, as
the Communist Party of the United States, a society to so advocate
and teach in contravention of the Smith Act. The indictment was
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brought under the following statutes: 54 STAT. 671, 18 U.S.C. § § 10,
11, 18 (1940); 62 STAT. 808, 18 U.S.C. § 2885 (1948); 62 STAr. 701,
18 U.S.C. 371 (1948). The court of appeals affirmed and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, that the trial court erred
by omitting to charge that the advocacy must be of action, not of
abstract doctrine, by the use of language reasonably and ordinarily
calculated to incite persons to action. Yates v. United States,
77 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1957).
It is well settled that the Constitution does not confer an abso-
lute right to unrestricted speech and that the state has the power to
delimit and prescribe punishment for utterances which endanger
the state's well-being. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United
States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919). By classic dictum, the words must be
used in such circumstances and be of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger of bringing about the substantive evils
Congress has a right to prevent. Schenck v. United States, supra
(dictum). Exception was made to this rule when the statute,
N.Y. PENAL LAws § § 160, 161, prohibited utterances of a specified
character; for the danger of the substantive evil having been legisla-
tively predetermined, the only question is sufficiency of evidence
to show a natural and probable effect. Gitlow v. New York, supra.
The exception made in Gitlow v. New York, has generally not
been followed, but some form of the "clear and present" danger
rule has been applied. See Dennis v. United States, supra; Pen-
nekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319
U.S. 583 (1943); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937). But see
Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (8th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 790 (1943); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
It appeared that the exception was made part of the rule in
Dennis v. United States, supra, by the Court's acceptance of the
court of appeals' interpretation of the rule, stated by Judge Learned
Hand: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the
'evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
This interpretation of the rule left some doubt of the causal
connection required between the words spoken and the evil appre-
hended; for this interpretation does not require that the [im] prob-
ability of the evil be a result of the speech, but could be construed
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as justifying a prior restriction of free speech because of a prob-
ability of the evil resulting from any cause. See Antieau, Dennis v.
United States-Precedent, Principle or PerversionP, 5 VAND. L. REv.
141 (1952).
It would seem that another question was raised by a second
holding in the Dennis case, that the court determines the existence
of the "clear and present" danger. Resolving the first doubt in
favor of a causal connection being required between the speech
used and the evil apprehended, the court would find that a "clear
and present" danger did or did not exist. If such did exist, it could
only exist because of the inciting character of the speech; for
preaching of an abstract doctrine could not create a "clear and
present" danger. Then the only question left for the jury would
be the sufficiency of the evidence to show a conspiracy.
The district court, in the principal case, held illegal advocacy
to be an utterance made with the specific intent to accomplish
forcible overthrow and since absence of inciting language would
not justify a finding of specific intent, reversal would be required
if the court found insufficient evidence to support the verdict; i.e.,
absence of inciting language. United States v. Schneiderman, 106
F. Supp. 906 (S.D. Cal. 1952), sub nom. Yates v. United States,
77 Sup. Ct 1064 (1957). It appears that, in effect, the court was
determining the character of the language before the question was
given to the jury.
The court of appeals held that an illegal conspiracy was shown
when an overt act in furtherance of the criminal design was shown.
If the doctrine of destruction had not become a rule of action then
no agreement or conspiracy had been shown. Yates v. United
States, 225 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1955).
In rejecting both of these views the Court iterated the import-
ance of distinguishing between speech that is a statement of an
abstract idea which may prompt its hearers to take unlawful action
and speech which advocates that action be taken. Neither of these
views require that the jury find the advocacy to be of action. One
may intend evil results from his speech, but in the absence of some
"probable" resulting harm he has committed no crime. Doctrinal
justification of forcible overthrow, though uttered with a specific
intent, is too remote from concrete action to constitute a "prob-
ability." It is no crime to conspire to advocate abstractly the over-
throw of the government even though it is the intent that such be
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accomplished. To agree to discuss the desirability of the destruc-
tion of the government is not an illegal conspiracy. Yates v. United
States, 77 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1957).
It is submitted that those doubts raised in Dennis are thus
resolved: (1) the speech must bear a causal relationship to the
danger; (2) the court, considering all the surrounding circum-
stances, determines that speech of a certain character creates a
"clear and present" danger; (3) the jury determines the character
of the speech.
"Every idea is an incitement", Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 673 (1925) (dissenting opinion of Justice Holmes), "but there
is an underlying validity in the distinction between advocacy and
interchange of ideas, and we do not discard a useful tool because it
may be misused." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 546 (1951)
(concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). The exercise of the
right of free speech lies at the foundation of free government by
free men. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
It is believed that the ruling in the principal case, though tend-
ing to allow the formation and continued existence of certain groups
which harbor contempt for our form of government and our religious
and social values, assures us that one of our most cherished freedoms,
the right to express one's views without fear of censure, has not
been encroached upon.
"When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and
free discussion exposes the false and they gain few adherents. Full
and free discussion even of ideas we hate encourages the testing of
our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free discussion
keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the
stresses and strains that work to tear all civilization apart." Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 584 (1951) (dissenting opinion of
Justice Douglas).
When the fears and excitement caused by the present day
world conflict have died away, this decision will be viewed as one
stating but well recognized legal principles.
J. McD.
CRMnINAL LAw-HABEAs COIIPUS-LACK OF JURISDICTION RESULT-
ING FRoM FAiLnnm TO COMPLY WrrH HABrruAL CRIMiNAL STATUTE.-
P, convicted of a felony for the third time, was sentenced to life
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